Macalester International
Volume 19 The United Nations Organization: What
Future?

Article 7

Summer 2007

Editor's Note

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macintl
Recommended Citation
(2007) "Editor's Note," Macalester International: Vol. 19, Article 7.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macintl/vol19/iss1/7

This Front Matter is brought to you for free and open access by the Institute for Global Citizenship at DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Macalester International by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more
information, please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu.

EDITOR’S NOTE
The United Nations Organization is not different from other structures
created by humans—at least in this sense: it is not immune to the vagaries of change. Most modifications are partly induced by external pressures and partly generated by organic permutations. Thus, in 2005,
spoke Kofi Annan, the former Secretary-General:
As globalization shrinks distances…issues become increasingly interconnected, the comparative advantage of the United Nations becomes ever
more evident. So, too, however, do some of its real weaknesses. From
overhauling basic management practices and building a more transparent, efficient and effective United Nations system to revamping our
major intergovernmental institutions so that they reflect the world…we
must reshape the organization in ways not previously imagined and
with a boldness and speed not previously shown.1

Before I comment on Annan’s call for transformation, a very brief
review of the making of the organization’s history seems in order. The
appearance of the modern nation-state was a momentous happening.
At least as far back as the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the nation-state
brought with it claims of exclusive and clashing identities and material
interest that, in a number of registers, created new tensions which, in
turn, necessitated transnational means and institutions of adjudication,
if not collaboration. More dramatically, though the tug between the
twin phenomena of warring and peace-making have an older pedigree, it was the birth of nationalism and its structural embodiment, the
modern state, that at once compounded a contradictory, competitive,
and conflictual “Othering” and the possibilities for larger mutualities
among the different.
On top of earlier but more limited battles between some (primarily
European) nations over territory, imperial ambition, or national pride,
the Twentieth Century is quintessentially known for two conflagrations, dubbed world wars. The designation was appropriate mainly
because of the geographical scale, the magnitude of the destruction,
and the consequences for international coexistence. The war of 1914–
1918 has acquired a legendary status based on its unprecedented
degree of intimate ferocity; the Second World War, 1939–1945, is best
remembered for being the first bloody clash in which nuclear weapons were used. Among the numerous ramifications of each war were
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efforts to shorten the duration of blood letting, as well as search for
the cessation of hostilities and institutional arrangements that would
secure peace in the future.
In an attempt to simultaneously keep the United States out of what
was primarily a European affair and to insure that the option of peace
would be available, President Woodrow Wilson, on 22 January 1917,
announced to the world a perspective of “peace without victory.”
The structural linchpin of the vision was to be the League of Nations.
Though Wilson was neither successful in his objective to avoid American involvement in the war nor the immediate materialization of the
League, the idea for the latter was given new visibility by the President’s January 8, 1918, announcement of his now famous Fourteen
Points. A key item here was the proposition that every nation would
“determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing
by the other peoples of the world as against force and self aggression.”
This declaration has since become a source of inspiration for, if not the
battle cry of, every group that identifies itself as a cohesive community
and in search of recognition by others.
Whatever the long-term promise and ultimate value of the League
of Nations in creating a new international order, new developments
took the wind out of its sails: the rise of an acute resentment on the
part of the defeated Central Powers, especially Germany and Italy;
the onset of the Great Depression that started in 1929; and the Italian
fascist invasion of Ethiopia. The first is illuminated by the reactions of
Germany and Italy to the armistice of November 1918 and the completion of the terms of defeat, including the reorganization of Europe, the
Middle East, China, and Africa, a year later. In the second case, tens of
millions in the industrial West experienced a drastic shrinkage of their
material welfare to such an extent that they were thrown into abject
poverty, if not destitution and immediate hunger. Third, Italy was a
comparatively latecomer to its own national unification and, thus, felt
left with meager possibilities to satisfy its own appetite for colonial
conquest. It decided to win two victories in one act—that is, redeem its
resounding defeat by Abyssinia at the battle of Adowa in 1896 (the first
modern time a non-European state vanquished a European power)
and establish itself among the colonial club of states.
The League of Nations, structurally so weak, did not survive these
pressures. With Japan’s launch of full-scale aggression against China in
1937, the galloping nazification and militarization of Germany and its
subsequent takeover of Austria in 1938 and attacks on Czechoslovakia
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and Poland in March and September of 1939, the League’s total ineffectiveness became glaringly obvious. The Second World War was in
full swing. In quick time, it will engulf most of Europe, many parts of
Asia and North Africa, and directly involve the United States. Though
the Axis was crushed, the cost was colossal, particularly in human lives
and material assets. Consequently, the old conundrum of how to at
once minimize conditions conducive to warfare and cultivate peaceful relations among nations returned with even greater force. Part of
the genesis of what we now call the United Nations Organization goes
back to August 1941, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime
Minister Winston Churchill of Britain signed what was then named
the “Atlantic Charter.” Nearly half a year later, 26 countries bestowed
the words “United Nations” to distinguish themselves from Germany,
Japan, and Italy. The main aim was to sketch the policies of the alliance.
Inspired by President Roosevelt’s wishes, a conference was convened in the city of San Francisco in April 1945, with the intention of
drafting the U.N. Charter. Though President Roosevelt was by then
dead, the Truman Administration carried the effort forward. The foundational principle of the new United Nations Organization was to
forestall another world war and, thus, secure future generations from
a fate potentially worse than that of their ancestors. Notwithstanding
the loftiness of the objectives and the sobriety that accompanied the
conclusion of the War, a jostling for power among the victorious and
the newly ambitious quickly transpired. More specifically, the “Big
Three” allies (U.S.A., U.S.S.R., and Britain) ran into significant differences in their respective understanding of the ensuing post-war
era and the structure, functions, and decision-making processes of the
organization. A number of new arrangements were enacted to clarify
important responsibilities. For instance, inequality in power among
the members was expressed through the creation of the Security Council, with the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, China, and a weak
France given permanent seats and veto power over resolutions. All
the founding countries, who in 1945 amounted to fifty-one, automatically became members of the United Nations Organization, with seats
in the General Assembly. The greatest expansion of the membership
of the U.N.O. came with the decolonization of the 1950s and early
1960s, when many of the people of what we now call the “Global
South” became sovereign nations. At the time of this writing, there
are 192 members. In addition to the Security Council and the General
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Assembly, the other main components include the Economic and Social
Council, the International Court of Justice, and the General Secretariat.
There are also the linked but autonomous organizations and specialist
technical institutions (e.g., UNESCO, FAO, WHO, UNEP, etc.). Despite
the creation of such a complex structure, there is no question that the
U.N.O. has very limited power. Though informed by idealism and a
spirit of cosmopolitanism, its effectiveness is highly constrained by
two onerous factors: the self-interest of its members (especially the
powerful) and the immensity, in the face of meager resources, of the
problems that face the world. The first is the familiar syndrome of
seeking national particularity and concomitant leadership that thrives
on stressing difference as well as a normalization of a zero-sum mindset (first tutored by Nicolo Machiavelli and refined for contemporary
international affairs by his epigons called “realists”). Some scholars go
even further and postulate that this contradictory dimension was deviously present in the thinking of the United States at the very founding
moment of the organization.
The Roosevelt Administration hit upon a fundamental insight: that international institutions could be constructed to face simultaneously in two
radically different directions. One face would be turned in the direction
of mass popular politics, both within the U.S. and internationally. This
would be the inspiring ethical face, offering promise of a better world.
But simultaneously, the internal face of the organization could be shaped
in an entirely different and indeed opposite way, as a framework for the
power politics of the hegemon. Moreover, this was the key to success
in setting up the U.N.—the two would not be in tension: the moralistic
mask could both conceal and strengthen the inner countenance of the
institution.2

The second issue ranges from existing possessions or new acquisitions of weapons of mass destruction; mass poverty and inequality
(particularly within nations), in which a distancing of the economy and
politics from public influence, if not regulation, commensurate with
the power of the citizen, is on the rise; and environmental menaces of
biblical proportions that seem to be gathering momentum. In recent
years, many have put their faith in the office of the Secretary-General
to assume the mantle of global leadership, but this wish has met with
severe disappointments primarily attributable to the original design.
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The U.N., writes Samantha Powers, gave equal voice to dictatorships and
democracies, but its charter took sides, calling on members to respect
human rights and fundamental freedoms. The U.N., like any other organization, depended on authoritative leadership, but power was put in
the hands of the Security Council, a squabbling committee dominated by
five permanent members with widely divergent interests and political
systems. The Secretary-General, the nominal face of the organization,
was appointed to serve as only the chief administrative officer. He was
a servant of the states, a point drive home by his place of work, a secretariat.3

There is a lot to cogitate upon in the sobering judgments of Cowan
and Powers. But some attribute the shortcomings of the United Nations
to other factors. Eminent here are (neo-) conservatives in the United
States. They accuse the organization of being guilty of a number of
capital offenses: (a) a departure from the “original mission” which was
limited to aiding member nations in peaceful resolution of international misunderstandings, if not disputes; (b) an enormous growth of
bureaucratic complexity and duplication; (c) a mismanagement of its
finances and outright malfeasance; (d) a weakening of administrative
competence and, in its place, practices of cronyism; and (e) an undue
hostility to its greatest benefactor, the United States. To amplify these
defects, American critics have long suggested a return to what they
hold to be the primary purpose of the organization and, thus, a retreat
from expanding transgressions on the sovereignty of nation-states.
Conservatives would not want the U.N.O. to be involved in holding
elections or supplying food to the starving, let alone getting ensnared
by what they see as ill-advised and bottomless projects of “nation
building.” Moreover, to discourage “wasteful indulgences,” they proffer that the U.N. budget and administrative operations be drastically
reduced, perhaps by as much as half in the case of employees. Extreme
conservatives are so suspicious of the very existence of the U.N. that
they believe that it is simply a Trojan horse for a “totalitarian World
Government” bent on usurping American sovereignty and, therefore,
destroying its unique institutions of political culture. In light of this
perspective, the extreme Right would prefer the U.S. to leave the organization and have U.N. headquarters moved somewhere else. The less
paranoid, if not more informed and worldly, demand less onerous
financial contributions from the U.S. and a more explicit appreciation
from the rest for America’s principles, generosity, and willingness to
carry a larger portion of the burden.4
xv
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On the other side, the point of view of the Left is equally critical.
With the intense and continuing debate over the invasion of Iraq and
other explosive issues in the Middle East in the background, Perry
Anderson asserts that U.S. dominance, though not victorious or visible
in every instance, still conditions major decision making.
Today, paramountcy does not mean omnipotence. The U.S. cannot count
on always securing UN legitimation of its actions ex ante. But where this
is wanting, retrospective validation is readily available, as the occupation
of Iraq has shown. What is categorically excluded is active opposition on
the part of the UN to any significant U.S. initiative. A Security Council resolution, let alone a secretary-general, condemning an American
action is unthinkable. Ben Ki-Moon, whose appointment required Chinese assent, may keep a lower profile than Annan, but his role is unlikely
to be very different. The U.S. grip on the organization has not relaxed,
as can be seen from current UN resolutions on Lebanon and Iran. Anxious voices form liberal opinion, worrying that the organization might
become irrelevant if Bush’s ‘unilateralism’ were to persist, and plaintive
appeals from the Left to defend the UN from distortion by Washington, are regularly heard today. That can be reassured. The future of the
United Nations is safe. It will continue to be, as it was intended to be, a
serviceable auxiliary mechanism of the Pax Americana.5

If some doubt that the founding of the United Nations Organization
was solely a sincere attempt to at once end the hostilities and usher in
an epoch of mutual security and peace among nations, the record of
the past sixty years displays significant accomplishments. True, there
had been numerous local conflicts, regional instabilities, and, of course,
four decades of a balance of terror between two nuclear-armed camps.
Yet, the U.N.O. rightly celebrated this milestone, legitimately claiming credit for the avoidance, thus far, of a cataclysmic Third World
War. Furthermore, the U.N. agencies have taken numerous initiatives
to address scourges such as disease, hunger, and ignorance. These
achievements notwithstanding, a combination of old and new doubts
is haunting the organization. Prominent among the first are the prevailing distribution of power among regions and nations (particularly in
the Security Council), a paucity of successful and deliberative thinking
that produces impartially binding resolutions, the resistance to electing an autonomous and empowered leadership, and acute inadequacy
of financial contributions. The more novel concerns bring forth issues
that relate to institutional competence, transparency, and efficiency.
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But, as former Secretary-General Kofi Annan had already declared,
the epoch of globalization is forging out of the durable worries and the
fast-moving developments a deeper and more complicated challenge:
the coexistence of at once different yet continuously interpenetrating
global histories and intensifying urgencies around specific issues. Robert W. Cox, one of the most original and cosmopolitan thinkers of our
time, offers a precious counsel that is worthy of a lengthy reproduction:
In a multi-civilizational world order, the role of a world organization
would be to seek out principles acceptable in the ‘common sense’ or
intersubjectivity of each of the different civilizations—to distill a kind
of supra-intersubjectivity from the distinct intersubjectivities of its component parts. This could only come about through a lengthy learning
process from experience in reconciling conflicts. Two conditions would
be indispensable: the emergence of a core body of people who would
cultivate an empathetic understanding of forms of common sense other
than their own—who could bridge intersubjectivities; and the development of civil societies capable of articulating the basic sentiments and
goals of the people who compose them… . Civil society is the force that
develops the intersubjective content of civilizations; and the core group
which assumes the task of reconciliation of differences would have to
keep abreast of these developments in the dynamics of civilization. This
concept of a structure for world order is far from being an institutionalized form of global governance. It envisages a weak centre embodying certain accepted common principles in a world fragmented among
peoples guided by different sets of social practices and goals. Such a pluralistic framework of weak centre in a fragmented whole has precedence
in world history—in the European medieval Papacy, and in periods of
Chinese history, for example. Such a structure would not displace the
nation-state system or the international economy. It would provide the
framework of principles within which the state system and economic
relations could be regulated.6

In addition to his call for a cosmopolitan “common sense,” Cox
identifies specific issues that many agree to be at the heart of a reinvigorated United Nations Organization: protection of the environment,
avoidance of violence and aggression, curbing of social inequities,
restraining if not extinguishing organized criminal activities, and the
establishment of a common understanding and promotion of human
rights. The world needs the U.N.O. more now than six decades ago.
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The organization also desperately needs the full attention of, and concrete investment from, its members more than ever before.

*****
Our discussion opens with the keynote remarks of Janice Gross Stein.
Cognizant of numerous difficulties that confront the organization,
including its very legitimacy, Stein focuses on three items she considers
to be of great normative weight: “Freedom from want, freedom from
fear, and freedom to live in dignity.” According to Stein, the U.N. can’t
be solely responsible for these concerns, but to be part of the solution,
the organization must become a more efficient convener and manager
at the core of “newly emergent global networks.”
Francis M. Deng’s main concern is the troublesome disjunction
between the pull of national interest and that of transnational solidarity. His essay concentrates on “the crisis of internal displacement and
the response of the United Nations.” In response, Tonderai W. Chikuhwa explores the pivotal concept of “sovereignty as responsibility.”
He suggests that, “positive dialogue and diplomacy” would have to
be coupled with “a structured regime of compliance” if the world is
to effectively address the needs of those in greatest danger. Dianna J.
Shandy stresses three points: the role of colonial legacies and current
disparities in global power relations; the ramification of diminished
sovereignty as a result of an “ascendancy” of NGO influence in Africa;
and the implications of the distinction made between a refugee and an
internally displaced person.
Among the severe critics of the United Nations is Nile Gardiner.
His remarks underscore what he sees as the countless and embarrassing failures of the organization. These range from mismanagement of
assets and corruption to ineffectiveness in the face of brutal autocracies
bent on using aggression and terror to get their way. Gardiner makes a
spirited case for the United States’ commitment and material contribution to the birth and sustainability of the United Nations. He stresses
that the fate of the organization is, as it were, in its own hands. Its
future depends on how competently it responds to the three demons
of the present: terrorism, tyranny, and genocide. Natalia Mari Espejo
concurs with some of Gardiner’s contributions and disputes other
arguments, including the role of the United States. Espejo reminds us
of the “structural shortcomings” of the U.N. as well as the impact of
“the current geopolitical reality.” Andrew Latham begins his response
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to Gardiner by digging up the neo-conservative ideological underpinnings of the perspective. Second, Latham deems Gardiner’s suggestion
to improve the organization to be, in the end, “either irrelevant or
counterproductive.” This is a fierce engagement that at once acknowledges the necessary reforms the U.N.O. must embrace and yet defends
the organization against any crude manipulations by the most powerful.

*****
The 2007 Macalester International Roundtable returns to the area of
the arts, but with a twist. With the theme The Musical Imagination in
the Age of Globalization, the Roundtable will comprise scholarly essays
and discussions on the music of regions such as the Mediterranean and
Western Europe, China, and African America, as well as an evening
musical performance. We are looking forward to this combination.
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